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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost thirty years ago Robert Keeton observed that the attorney retained by
an insurance company to defend a claim against its insured represents two clients
with potentially conflicting interests.' Noting that defense lawyers did not disclose such conflicts to either the insured or the insurer under the then "prevailing
practice," '2 Keeton anticipated an increase in the number of legal malpractice
3
suits instituted by either the insured or the insurer against defense attorneys.
Notwithstanding Keeton's prophetic warning and the formulation of supplementary ethical guidelines for insurers and "their" defense attorneys, 4 a significant number of lawyers still fail to identify the ethical problems inherent in
simultaneous representation of the insured and the insurer. A recent trial court
opinion described the lawyer's dilemma:
[T]he relationship between the liability insurer and the insured rests
upon a hardboiled commercial transaction. The purchaser has a powerful need for protection against the potentially devastating effects of a
large money judgment against him or her. The seller is prepared to provide that protection for a price, but, understandably, only on several conditions including the right to choose the defense lawyer, and the right to
control and supervise the defense. There is an inescapable tension for a
lawyer, subject to ethical commands far more stringent than those of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.S. 1969, Ohio State University; J.D. 1976, Ohio State University.
I Keeton, Labilay Insurance and Responsihitiyfor seulmnin, 67 HARV. L. R v. 1136, 1168 (1954) [hereinKeeton].
after2cited as
1d. at 1171.
31d. at 1171-73.
4See inca note 31 and accompanying text.
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insurance marketplace, who must be faithful to the interests of the inmust also "represent the insured
surer-client in control of the defense, and
5
as his client with undivided fidelity."
A new malpractice crisis may not be at hand, but several factors have contributed to an increase in the number of reported appellate decisions involving
charges of defense malpractice. 6 First, the insurer's obligations to the insured
have changed rapidly through judicial expansion of the tort of "insurer's bad
faith,"'7 as well as through legislative definitions of "unfair" claims settlement
practices." The insurer's duties have evolved into a "checklist of required actions,
breach of any one of which may result in the insurer's extracontractual liability
[rather] than . ..a workable guide to forseeability of such damages in a given
case." 9 As long as the outer limits of "bad faith" are uncertain and "subject to
the convincing art of the trial lawyer," 10 some defense lawyers, although acting
in good faith, may render poor advice to their carrier clients and subject those
clients to extracontractual liability. The lawyer may then be called upon to indemnify his insurer-employer for any loss it suffers due to the lawyer's negligence. IIIn addition, plaintiffs' lawyers are learning to identify and in some cases
engineer conflicts between the insured and the insurer. The plaintiffs counsel
then exploit such conflicts to obtain settlement leverage or an additional "deep
pocket," the unwary defense counsel. 12 Finally, some observers argue that a new
wave of public criticism of the legal profession, and the publicity associated with
the "countersuit phenomenon,"' 3 have contributed to a legal environment in
14
which the attorney is viewed as the "new target defendant."'
This Article will not survey and catalog all available cases dealing with the
"insurance counsel's tightrope."' 5 Instead, it will focus on the identification and
5 Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
6 Open Forum. The Insurance Defense Counsel on Trial, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 132 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Open Forum] (noting a proliferation of suits); Mallen, Insurance Counsel. The Fine Line Between Professional
Responsibility and Malpractice, 45 INS. COUNS. J. 244 (1978).
7See, e.g., 1 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5.34 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1 LONG].
8
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790.-. 10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982). The California Unfair Practices Act
was patterned after the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Model Act of 1971. Over 30
states have adopted similar legislation. Best, Statutes and Regulations Controling Life and Health Insurance
Claims Practices, 29 DEF. L.J. 115, 152 (1980). In a remarkable opinion, Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that
the third-party claimant in a personal injury case could assert an implied private right of action against
the defendant's insurer for a violation of its provisions. Royal Globe and its implications for insurance
defense counsel's liability are noted briefly in Kornblum, Royal Globe v. Superior Court: Its Impact on Litigation
Involving Insurers, 29 DEF. L.J. 355, 371- 72 (1980); see also, Comment, Extending The Liability of Insurersfor Bad
Faith Acts. Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 777 (1980).
9 Rumberger, Kirk & Wall,Justice Holmes and the Trial Lawyer. Malicious Prosecution, Bad Faith And...
Excellence, 16 FORUM 627, 632 (1981).
'ld. at 629.
" See Keeton, supra note 1, at 1173 (arguing that the potential exposure of the attorney employed by
the insurer should "give him pause," unless he is confident that the company will not look to him for
indemnity).
12See infra text accompanying note 97.
13 Berlin, Countersuit, in LEGAL MEDICINE 117-18 (1980).
14 Zilly, Recent Developments in Legal Malpractice, 6 Litigation 8, 12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Zilly]. A
recent survey of the law of conflicts of interest observes that the percentage of attorneys facing malpractice
claims rose from one-half of one percent in 1973 to eight percent five years later, although claims arising
from conflicts of interest accounted for only a small percentage of all claims. Developments in the LawConflicts ofInterest, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1487 & n.83 [hereinafter cited as Conflits of Interest];cf.National
Law Journal, Oct. 26, 1981, at 3, col. 1 (conflicts accounting for a larger percentage of claims).
15 The terminology is Zilly's, supra note 14, at 16. For such a survey see R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE (1977) [hereinafter cited as MALLEN & LEvrr].
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resolution of conflicts of interest that may arise at various stages of the litigation
of a medical malpractice action in which a lawyer has been retained to represent
the interests of both the physician policy-holder and his insurance carrier. Many
of the problems examined are applicable to all insurance defense litigation, and
the combination of large claims and complex issues presented in medical mal16
practice cases, together with the distrust of lawyers shared by many doctors,
provides particularly fertile ground for conflicts of interests and legal malpractice
claims.
Before turning to specific conflicts of interest found in a hypothetical litigation, it is appropriate to review the source and nature of the lawyer's obligations
to the insured and the insurer.

II. THE

SOURCE AND NATURE OF THE LAWYER'S OBLIGATIONS

A. Who Is the Lawyer's Client
In order for the attorney to perform his role properly, he must never
lose sight of the fact that he is working for two different and distinct parties-the insured and the insurer. He must fully disclose to both parties
the information he has obtained as a result of his unique relationship with
them. Whenever he cannot both legally and ethically perform his duties
to the best of his ability, he must disqualify himself from acting contrary
to those principles. Regardless of anything else, the attorney must never
forget that his primary obligation is to his client, and that client is the
insured.17
The physician defendant in a third party action is the lawyer's client, even
though he does not pay the fee.' 8 The defense of the insured is the primary
reason for the lawyer's retainer, and the lawyer's obligations to the insured arise
from this attorney-client relationship. Therefore, the lawyer's potential liabilities
to the insured are broader than the insurer's. They are not derived from or negated by the express terms of the policy, 19 or subject to any limitation implicit in
a subjective definition of "bad faith."'2 0 Liability is imposed on the attorney for
professional negligence in the conduct of his client's affairs, and not on the basis
of any covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in the contract of
insurance.
In addition to the physician defendant, the defense counsel also has the malpractice carrier as a client, even though the carrier is not a formal party to the
16See, e.g., Havener, ObservationsRegarding Investigation and PreparationofAMedical MalpracticeLitigation, in
DEFENSE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 7, 9-10 (DRI Monograph No. 4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as

Havener].
17Ford, The Insurance Contract The Confcts ofInterest It Breeds, 36 INS. COUNS. J. 610, 620 (1969).
18Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. at 872; American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 592, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 572 (1974); Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,

84 N.J. 325, -, 419 A.2d 417, 424 (1980); see also Pennix v. Winton, 61 Cal. App. 2d 701, 143 P.2d 940
(1943) (reversing a defense verdict and remanding for a new trial when the defense attorney, in "good
faith," deprived the plaintiff of a fair trial by repeated reference to the collusion and fraud of the plaintiff
and the insured defendant whom counsel described as only "technically . . .my client").
19 See infta text accompanying note 118; see also Heller v. Alter, 143 Misc. 783, 257 N.Y.S. 391 (1932)
(defense counsel retained by insurance company to defend its insured not relieved of his duty to represent
the insured by the insurer's insolvency).
2 Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, -, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 412-16 (1968).
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litigation.2 ' The carrier relies upon the attorney's professional acumen to insure
that it does not blunder in the handling of the claim and increase the carrier's
exposure to the claimant or invite a suit by the insured for an act of "bad
faith. "22

Accordingly, the attorney is in a position that has traditionally been
of multiple clients with potentially conflicting interavoided-the representation
23
ests in a litigation setting.
B.

The Standard of Care

Because the attorney's obligations arise out of the attorney-client relationship,
as opposed to the contract of insurance, his duty, found in general tort law, is to
advise both of his clients with the skill and care that a reasonable attorney would
exercise under the circumstances. 2 4 To determine if this customary standard has

been violated, the jury in a legal malpractice action needs a yardstick for identifying prudent attorney conduct. The Code of Professional Responsibility, together with formal and informal "opinions" construing it, provides a baseline for
identifying acceptable defense practice.2 5 An increasing number of trial judges
are finding that violations of the Code are evidence of negligence,2 6 ignoring the

disclaimers contained in the Code discouraging use of its provisions as evidence
27
of a standard of care.
The Code provides a formula for resolving actual conflicts of interest, whether

such conflicts arise from divided loyalties or the disclosure of client confidences or
secrets. Specifically, the Code permits simultaneous representation of multiple
clients who consent to such representation after "full disclosure." In addition, it
must remain "obvious" during the course of the litigation that adequate repre-

sentation can be provided to each client. 28 To satisfy the Code the attorney must

21 Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. at 872; American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 592, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
22 Keeton, supra note 1, at 1173; Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 49 Il1. App. 3d 675, -, 364
N.E.2d
683, 685-87 (1977), aj'd, 71 111. 2d 306, 375 N.E.2d 118 (1978).
23
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 (1981).
24 Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d at -,
65 Cal. Rptr. at 414. But see Keeton, supra note 1, at 1171
(arguing
that
the
standard
is
measured
by
an
attorney
specializing in insurance defense litigation).
25
Concts ofIntrest, supra note 14, at 1489; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY ECs
5-14 to -17; DRs 4-101, 5-105.
26 In Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brummund and Belom, 74 I1. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365
(1979), aJ'd, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980) the intermediate appellate court opined:
It is true that the present action is one for malpractice and not a disciplinary proceeding, but
it would be anomalous indeed to hold that professional standards of ethics are not relevant
in a tort action, but are in a disciplinary proceeding. Both malpractice actions and disciplinary proceedings involve conduct failing to adhere to certain minimum standards, and we
must reject any suggestion that ethical standards are not relevant considerations in each.
Id. at -, 392 N.E.2d at 1371;stearo Woodruffv. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir. 1980);Inre Kuzman,
335 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ind. 1975); cf.Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Wis. 1977);
Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1973).
For the proposition that the Code should be used more expansively in civil litigation as a source of legal
norms to be applied to attorneys, see Morgan, onf'cts oInterests and the Former Cint in the Mo&I Rules of
Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUND, RESEARCH J. 993, 1001; Wolfram, The Code ofProfessionalResponsiilsty as a
Measure of Attorney Liabiliy in CWil itgaton, 30 S.C.L. REv. 281, 286-95 (1979). But see Bickel v. Mackie,
447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978).
27
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLrrY, Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1981):
The Code ...
(does not). . . undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for
professional conduct.
28
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REPONSiBILrrY DR 5-105(C) (1981) provides:
In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple clients if
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identify potential conflicts and explain their nature and significance in such de-

tail that each client, physician and carrier, can understand the desirability of
obtaining an independent attorney. If both clients elect to continue simultaneous representation after the attorney's explanation, then he has fulfilled his initial
obligations to each of them. The attorney must continue to satisfy the condition
that it remain "obvious" that he can exercise his independent professional judgment on behalf of each client. In the event that he can no longer exercise this
judgment, the attorney must withdraw. Using this standard, if the attorney fails
to disclose a conflict that prevents him from fulfilling the full measure of his
responsibilities to one or the other of his clients, or if he advances the interests of
one client to the detriment of the other during any stage of the case, he exposes
himself to a malpractice claim.
Unfortunately, the Code provides little guidance to assist an attorney in identifying specific conflicts peculiar to insurance defense litigation, making it difficult for him to apply this consent-disclosure formula of the Code. The Code also
provides no guidelines for assessing the consequences that might flow from a
given conflict. Such guidelines could help the attorney determine whether it is
no longer "obvious" that he can represent both clients fairly. 29 Moreover, the
Code is silent as to the mechanics of withdrawal, and does not suggest any rule of
priority between the conflicting client interests before or after withdrawal. Several courts have suggested that the defense counsel's obligations to the insured
are primary,3 0 but if such language is factored into the consent-disclosure
formula, the Code does not explicitly take account of it.
The Code's lack of specificity was cured, to some extent, by the formulation of
the Guiding Principles of the National Conference of Lawyers and Liability Insurers.3 1 The Guiding Principles adopted the consent-disclosure formula as a
means of insuring that an attorney would advance the interests of both of his
clients. The Principles also identified many of the recurring conflicts of interest
between the insured and the insurer, and provided some additional guidance for
the timing and scope of disclosures. While the courts did not accept all of the
it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the
representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise
29

of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
Se, e.g., Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. at 872, which provides: "The canons and

disciplinary rules do not address themselves frankly and explicitly to this special set of relationships, and
there is awkwardness in attempts to apply the canons and rules."
3 See, e.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 592, 113 Cal. Rptr. at

572; Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 84 N.J. at -, 419 A.2d at 424.
31 20 FED. INS. COUNS. Q., Summer 1970, at 95. The Guiding Principles were formally approved by
the ABA on February 7, 1972, following their acceptance by each of the major casualty and liability
insurance companies in the United States. The Guilding Principles were reprinted in 7 MARTINDALEHUBBEL LAw DIRECTORY 76M (1978) and the AM. JUR. 2D DESK BOOK, Doc. No. 91.4 (Supp. 1978).
The Guiding Principles were rescinded by a voice vote in the House of Delegates in August 1980, at a time
when other "Statements of Principles" were under attack by the Justice Department and were also rescinded. The decision to rescind was not based on the substance of the Guiding Principles, however. See
Sonma9' of Action oftle House ofDelegates, A.B.A. ANN. MEETING (Aug. 5-6, 1980); Summay of Action ofthe

House of Delegates, A.B.A. MIDYEAR MEETING (Feb. 4-5, 1980). See Podgers, Statements of Pnnc'ols-Are
7.7 On The Wa Out?, 66 A.B.A. J. 129 (1980). As late as January 1981 the Guiding Principles were still
being cited by commentators with no mention of this rescission. See, e.g., T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 76 (2d ed. 1981); Open Forum,sura note 6, at 137, 156, 158-60, 164. But see
1 LONG, supra note 7, § 5-67 n.5 (noting the ABA's action without elaboration). Long refers to the ABA
action as "unfortunate," a view that will no doubt be shared by other commentators. Stern, Densma.rfor
Insurance Counsl-Copngwith ConActs oflntrest, 65 MASS. L. REV. 127, 129 (1980) (clarity and utility of the
Guiding Principles noted).
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solutions proposed in the Guiding Principles, 3 2 they did adopt them in part and
often cited them as secondary authority when formulating standards for identifying defense malpractice and bad faith in civil actions brought against attorneys
and their employer insurers. 33 Although their uncertain status raises some question as to their admissibility in future malpractice cases, the Guiding Principles
continue to provide a useful restatement of the case law of attorney liability in
this area of legal malpractice. Moreover, a malpractice plaintiff may still use the
standards as a checklist of potential claims, and then translate his arguments into
the more readily acceptable formulae of the Code or case law.
III.

IDENTIFYING AND RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: A
34
HYPOTHETICAL LITIGATION

In July 1980 the plaintiff suffered a serious brain injury while under the care
of Dr. Mensa, a neurosurgeon, and Dr. Carpenter, an orthopedic surgeon. A
lawsuit was filed on July 6, 1981 naming both physicians as defendants. Both Dr.
Mensa and Dr. Carpenter are insured by Insurer, with policy limits of $500,000
and $1,000,000 respectively. Dr. Carpenter reported the claim promptly and demanded that the Insurer provide a defense. On July 21 Dr. Mensa's wife reported the claim to Insurer, although Dr. Mensa had not been served with
summons. Insurer's claims manager told her that some forms would be sent to
Dr. Mensa, but that he need not consider himself sued until he was served with
35
summons. Summons was not served until October 8, 1981.
The complaint against the two physicians contained multiple counts of negligence, as well as allegations of gross, willful, and wanton conduct. The plaintiff
sought compensatory damages of $5,000,000 and punitive damages of
$3,000,000.
A short time after Dr. Mensa was served with summons, and before the defense attorney was retained, the plaintiff's attorney initiated preliminary negotiations with Insurer's claims manager. It was during these initial discussions that
he learned of the policy limits. 36 He immediately forwarded the following correspondence to Insurer:
Dear Sirs: In view of the maximum limits of coverage under your Insured's policies, my client has authorized me to make a written demand of
3

2 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 54.
33Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brummond and Belom, 74 Ill. App. 3d at -, 392 N.E.2d at 1371;
Y.M.C.A. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 552 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). In Employers
Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d at 559, the court stated:
We approve of the above quoted "guiding principles" as conforming to the public policy of
this state heretofore enunciated by this Court in our Canons of Ethics. They follow the same
general principles earlier recognized by Texas courts.
No reported case has considered the weight to be given such standards when presented as a matter of
defense to justify counsel's conduct. In support of their use as a matter of defense, compare Thornton v.
United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976) (trial attorney for murder defendant
followed ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION

§ 7.7 (1971); claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rejected).
34 The facts of this hypothetical litigation are drawn from reported medical malpractice cases, which
are cited at appropriate points in the text.
35 Medical Protective Co. v. Davis, 581 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
36 In connection with disclosure of policy limits see Slotkin v. Brookdale Hosp. Center, 357 F. Supp. 705
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (applying New York law, the court entertained a damage action against the insurer and
"others" because the plaintiff had been induced to settle a claim by fraudulent representations concerning
the policy limits).

19821

THE DOCTOR AND

His

LAWYER

$1,000,000. Refusal upon the part of your company to settle for this sum
would be tantamount to an act of "bad faith" against my client as well as
your insureds, and if judgment is obtained in excess of this amount, I will
make every
effort to collect the full amount of such judgment from your
37
company.

The physicians' malpractice policies contain the following provisions:
(1)A. TO PAY all loss by reason of the liability imposed by law upon the
Insured for damages on account of professional services rendered or which
should have been rendered by the Insured or any assistant to the Insured
during the term of this Policy including the dispensing of drugs or
medicine or any counterclaims in suit brought by the Insured to collect
fees providing such damages are claimed under any of the foregoing.
B. TO DEFEND the Insured without limit of cost in any suit against
the foregoing specifications filed at any time, and to furnish any bond not
exceeding in amount the minimum limit of this Policy which may be incidentally necessary for such suits, for appeals or the release of attachments
or garnishments; it being understood, however, 38that no law costs shall be
incurred without the consent of the Company.
In the event the Insured refuses to consent to the settlement or compromise by the Company of a claim or suit against the Insured, either the
Insured or the Company shall have the right to submit the matter to an
advisory committee of three members in good standing of the Medical
Society of the State. The Insured shall nominate one member of the committee', the Company the other, and the two members so chosen shall
select a third member who shall act as umpire in case of disagreement
between the two members chosen by the Insured and the Company. The
facts of the case shall be presented to the committee and the decision of a
majority of
said committee shall be binding on the Insured and the
39
Company.
Attorney was retained by Insurer to defend both physicians in the medical
malpractice action.
A. The Attornes Role in Coverage Disputes
Assume that Attorney tentatively accepted the retainer pending a review of
the claims file. Upon examining the file, Attorney noted the absence of any correspondence to the Insured physicians regarding the claims for punitive damages
or claims for compensatory damages in excess of the policy limits. When Attorney called Insurer for clarification, Insurer's claims manager asked Attorney to
prepare and forward to each Insured an "excess letter" 4 and a notice that the
defense would be conditioned on the Insured's acceptance of a reservation of
rights allowing Insurer to litigate coverage in a separate proceeding. 4 1 The
37

The text of this letter is suggested by Manchester Ins. and Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493

(Ky. 1975), and C.

ROBBINS, ATTORNEY'S MASTER GUIDE TO EXPEDITING TOP DOLLAR CASE SETTLEMENTS (1977).
38 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
20.03 n.25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
LOUISELL & WILLIAMS]. For standard provisions of a medical malpractice policy see McNeal, Patients,
Litzgatin and Patience, 33 INS. COUNS. J. 408 (1966).
39 2 R. LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 12.25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 2 LONG].
40 Sample forms for "excess situations" are provided in ExcEss LIABILITY, (DRI Monograph No.
-,1973).
41 A specimen reservation of rights letter and a sample nonwaiver agreement are provided in INSURER'S

DuTY To DEFEND, APPENDICES A & B (DRI Monograph No. 3, 1978).
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claims manager also sought advice with respect to potential coverage defenses,
including Dr. Mensa's "late notice" and his unilateral settlement of an earlier
unrelated claim.
Generally, in malpractice actions in which the defendant doctor is insured, the
carrier will advise the attorney of any coverage problems when it forwards the
claims file. 42 The coverage issues that are routinely brought to the attorney's
attention at this point may arise from claims for punitive damages for which the
insurer is not liable, 43 allegations in the complaint that describe conduct specifically excluded from coverage,4 4 or evidence that the insured failed to provide
timely notice of the claim or otherwise failed to "cooperate" with the insurer. 4 5
For purposes of the hypothetical, discussion will be limited to Attorney's discovery of potential coverage issues during his preliminary review of the file, Insurer's
request for assistance in the preparation of correspondence to the Insured, and
Insurer's request that Attorney research and advise Insurer as to the availability
46
of declaratory relief.
If coverage problems are apparent from counsel's examination of the claims
file, ordinarily the malpractice carrier will expect the attorney to draw attention
to them. Beyond that, a prudent insurer will direct the attorney not to become
involved in any coverage issues, and concentrate on the merits of the insured's
defense. In the hypothetical case, Attorney may draw the carrier's attention to
the absence of an "excess letter" and "reservation of rights," but he should not
prepare such correspondence, or procure a stipulation from either Insured that
the Insured accepts a conditional defense. Such activities are not only adverse to
the Insured's interest, but also create an appearance of impropriety that could
47
undermine the validity of any stipulations the Attorney might procure.
Moreover, an attorney should never research and advise the insurer on the
merits of any coverage dispute, 48 or participate in simultaneous or subsequent
litigation of such issues. 49 To do so would be tantamount to advancing a position
on behalf of the carrier that the attorney would be bound to oppose on behalf of
42

Havener, supra note 16, at 14.

43 2 LONG, npra note 39, § 12.04.
44 Malpractice policies ordinarily contain provisions excluding coverage for liability arising from crimi-

nal acts or bodily injury caused as the result of the violation of any statute, injuries arising from practice in

an area outside the scope of the physician's professional license, injuries caused while the physician was
under the influence of intoxicants or narcotics, or claims arising from the physician's failure to produce a
guaranteed result. 2 LONG, .upra note 39, §§ 12.27-.30; LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 38, § 20.04.
45 Policy conditions requiring prompt notice of claims or unusual occurrences and cooperation by the

insured have been the frequent source of litigation between the insured physician and his carrier. It is not
uncommon for the malpractice carrier to refuse to defend, or tender a conditional defense by invoking
such provisions. &* LOUSSELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 38, § 20.05. Often such defenses are colorable at
best. See, e.g., Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levy, 87 Misc. 2d 924, 387 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1976).
4 The attorney's exploitation of his fiduciary relationship to discover evidence adverse to the insured
for 4use
in a coverage dispute is discussed at text accompanying notes 40-54 bmfta.
7
See, e.g., Automobile Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Long, 63 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
4 Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1973). There are other reasons to adopt a
neutral position toward coverage issues. For example, the insurer may be tempted to tender a conditional
defense on a colorable ground as in Medical Protective Co. v. Davis, 581 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979),
from which the facts of the hypothetical case were drawn. If the court concludes that the insured properly
rejected a conditional defense, and that the ground for the refusal to defend unconditionally was without
merit, the insurer may be held liable for any subsequent verdict up to the policy limits, plus any costs of
defense, and possibly extracontractual damages in an appropriate case. The risk that the insurer will seek
indemnity from counsel who advised the insurer to tender the conditional defense is very real.
4ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 949 (1966); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Informal Op. 728 (1963).
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the insured.50
In the hypothetical case, Attorney should limit his activities to disclosure of
the nature and extent of the potential conflicts between the Insured physicians
and Insurer, so that all of his clients understand the importance of securing independent counsel. 5 ' In disclosures to the Insureds, Attorney should explain any
limitations on his role as defense counsel relative to the allegations of "gross,
willful and wanton" misconduct as well as his inability to assume a relationship
52
adversary to the carrier on any issue unrelated to the defense on the merits.
With respect to the potential conflicts that arise from claims in excess of the
policy limits or claims for punitive damages, the Guiding Principles set forth
general guidelines for a sufficient minimum disclosure. 53 With respect to other
coverage disputes that may be suggested by the file, arguably Attorney should go
further than the Guiding Principles and advise the Insureds that the expenses of
independent counsel are the carrier's responsibility. 54 This disclosure might influence the Insureds' decision to seek independent counsel rather than acquiesce
in continued representation by an attorney appointed by the carrier.
B. Pleadingsand Parties
A Representing Multiple Insureds
Potential conflicts arise when a single carrier insures more than one defendant. 55 Nonetheless, some courts find that there is no actionable impropriety inherent in joint representation of multiple insureds in the absence of an actual
conflict of interest. For example, in Spindle v. Chubb/Paqf Indemnity Group 56 a
neurosurgeon and an orthopedic surgeon were both represented by a firm retained by their common insurer. The two physician insureds had different policy
limits, their exposure had been reinsured in different amounts, and their poten50 ABA Comm. on Profession Ethics, Informal Op. 949 (1966); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Informal Op. 728 (1963); see also Trieber v. Hopson, 27 App. Div. 2d 151, 277 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1967); H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHmics 115 (1953).
51 See inla text accompanying notes 92 & 110.
52 For example, an attorney should not suggest that the insured write the insurer a bad faith letter or
advise the insured on the merits of the coverage dispute. Bianches, Coverage Dirputes Wih The Insured- The
Imurer's
Perspective, 48 INs. COUNS. J. 153, 154 (1981).
5
3See infta text accompanying note 110. When the coverage dispute arises from claims for punitive
damages or other damages in excess of the policy limits, the attorney's ethical obligation to defend the
insured's 6zbii should preclude any qualification of the defense. MALLEN & LEVrT, supra note 15, at 141
(Supp. 1980). The insurer is not attempting to terminate all benefits under the policy. Instead it is the
real party in interest up to the amount of the policy limits. It retains the right to control the defense, and it
need not pay for independent counsel selected by the insured, because the insured is getting all that he

bargained for under the policy. If, on the other hand, the insurer's policy defense would void the insurance
contract or terminate all policy benefits, then the insured is exposed to the entire amount of any adverse
judgment. Accordingly, the insured should have the right to control the defense through independent
counsel,
at the insurer's expense.
4

See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Louis Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 1978); All-Star
Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160, 165 (N.D. Ind. 1971); Executive Aviation, Inc. v. National
Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347, 354 (1971); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peppers,
64 11. 2d 187,-, 355 N.E.2d 24, 31 (1976); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396,-, 347 A.2d

842, 852-54 (1975); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 45 A.D.2d 350, -, 358 N.Y.S.2d 519, 524, aJd,38
N.Y.2d 735, 343 N.E.2d 758, 381 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1975); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pildner, 40 Ohio St.
2d 101, -, 321 N.E.2d 600, 602 (1974); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, -, 240 A.2d 397,

404 (1968).
55 The possibility of suits against multiple defendants with the same insurer is increasing as fewer carriers provide malpractice coverage. See Havener, supra note 16, at 13.
5 89 Cal. App. 3d 706, 152 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1979).
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tial liability differed. Upon tendering notice of the plaintiff's claims against him,
the neurosurgeon was advised by the carrier that there were no apparent conflicts
of interest between the codefendants, and that it would be more economical to
share common counsel. He consented to simultaneous representation, but refused to consent to any settlement of the lawsuit. After trial, but before verdict,
the plaintiff offered to compromise all her claims against both physicians for
$350,000. No settlement was concluded, although the neurosurgeon's codefendant had directed the insurer to settle the claims against him within his $500,000
policy limit. 5 7 The jury returned a verdict of $404,000 and the attorney negotiated the release of the codefendant for $300,000. The insurer paid the entire
judgment, allocating $300,000 to the codefendants' policy limit and $104,000 to
the neurosurgeon's policy. The neurosurgeon then brought separate actions
against the insurer and his former defense attorney, contending that the insurer's
initial representation that there were no apparent conflicts between him and his
codefendant were false and fraudulent, and made to induce him to forego independent counsel. 58 He reasoned that if he had known of his codefendant's
policy limit, reinsurance, and degree of exposure, he would have secured independent counsel and tried to get a compromise of all claims to be funded by
his codefendant's policy, thereby eliminating the chance that any judgment
would be entered against him. 59 The court rejected these contentions on the
ground that the insurer's representations were true when made, that none of the
alleged conflicts were actual conflicts, and that the neurosurgeon had no right to
have his codefendant's policy applied to settle his own potential liabilities. 6° In
the companion case against the law firm, the court rejected the neurosurgeon's
theory of damages 6' without reaching the questions of the firm's liability or the
recoverability of damages for injury to the neurosurgeon's reputation attributa62
ble to the judgment that was entered against him.
Although Spindle and its companion case suggest that simultaneous representation of multiple insureds may be permissible in some instances, the two cases
provide little comfort or practical guidance to defense counsel. In order to avoid
malpractice claims, counsel must recognize potential conflicts, and then recommend employment of separate counsel if at all possible. To help the lawyer in
this process, the Guiding Principles suggested the following prophylactic rule:
57

1d. at 710, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
Kirtland and Packard v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 140, 131 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1976).
59 The attorney allegedly did not inform the neurosurgeon of this offer, and the opinion does not contain any discussion of findings relevant to such nondisclosure. The court did not consider how disclosure of
the offer and the alleged conflicts of interest might have affected the physician's settlement posture before
verdict. With respect to an attorney's obligation to keep the insured informed of settlement negotiations
see infra text accompanying notes 106-20.
60 89 Cal. App. 3d at 713, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 780. The court stated that none of the alleged conflicts,
when viewed separately, would render the attorney's simultaneous representation less effective, thereby
resulting in actual conflict. The court reasoned that the alleged inadequacies of the insurer's disclosures,
58

when viewed in the context of the neurosurgeon's persistent refusals to settle, did not state a claim for
fraud or bad faith. Id. at 714, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
61 The neurosurgeon's damage claims were somewhat contrived. For example, he sought recovery of
the full amount of the $404,000 judgment although the carrier, not he, had paid the full amount of the
judgment and expressed satisfaction with the result. In addition, he sought recovery of any judgment that
might be awarded in a later filed, but unrelated, malpractice action against him, on the theory that but for
the verdict in the first case, the second plaintiff would not have discovered her claim against him. While
the viability of such a damage claim was not properly before it, the court expressed little enthusiasm for it.
59 6Cal.
App. 3d at 146, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 421.
2
1d. But see cases cited in/a notes 118 & 119.
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VII. Suit Involving More Than One Insured In the Same Company
If the same company insures two or more parties to a lawsuit, whose
interests are diverse, the complete factual investigation made by the company should be made available to each insured or his attorney with the
exception that any. statement given by one insured or his employees shall
not voluntarily be given to any other party to the litigation whose interest
may be adverse to such insured or to any attorney representing such other
party.
The company should employ separate attorneys not associated with
one another to defend each insured against whom any suit is brought, if
the interest of one such insured is diverse from or in conflict with that of
any other insured; and all insureds should be informed by the company of
the fact that it insures the liability63 of the others and the method being
employed to handle the litigation.
Under this standard if the codefendant insureds have differing interests that have
not yet ripened into actual conflicts, the insurer will retain its right to control
their defense only if it employs independent counsel for each insured, at the insurer's expense. 64 Accordingly, one may question the sufficiency of the disclosures made to the neurosurgeon in Spindle and the wisdom of continuing
simultaneous representation in that case.
Aside from the general problems inherent in representing more than one insured, the hypothetical case should suggest a welter of additional conflicts to a
prudent attorney. For example, an attorney's initial review of the file may suggest a potential cross-claim between the co-parties, 65 or the necessity of vigorously contending on behalf of one insured that the other was solely responsible
for the plaintiff's injury. 6 6 Moreover, the attorney may be wise to assume, before
the initial interview, that one client's testimony may weaken or disparage the
other's position, or that one client may confide information that should be kept
from the other.6 7 The attorney has an obligation to make sure that both insureds
are fully aware of the perils of simultaneous representation prior to any joint
consultation, and take care that the confidences and secrets of one client are not
furnished to the other. 68 Such potential conflicts probably will occur in all cases
in which an attorney is retained to represent multiple insureds. It would be wise,
therefore, for the attorney to reject such employment as a general rule, and
69
thereby avoid the consequences of a belated withdrawal or future litigation.
See supra note 31.
Carriers often insure medical partnerships. 2 LONG, supra note 39, § 12.20. In Joseph v. Markovitz,
27 Ariz. App. 122, 571 P.2d 57 (1976), a partner who had suffered a judgment in excess of his malpractice
coverage filed a third-party claim against his partner asserting that the partnership agreement provided
for indemnity for 20% of the amount of the excess. The partner's common insurer was required to pay the
63

64

costs
6 5 of defending the third-party action by independent counsel.
See generally Hutcheson, Recumnng Conict Problems Facing Insurance Defense Lawyers, in
INTEREST IN INSURANCE

PRACTICE

CONFLICTS OF

39, 40 (DRI Monograph No. 5, 1971) [hereinafter cited as

Hutcheson].
66 See generally MALLEN & LEvrr (Supp. 1980), supra note 15, at 144.
67 In Spindle v. Chubb/Pacific Indem. Group, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 714 n.5, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 781 n.5,
the court took care to point out that nothing was said by one codefendant about the other that would have
weakened his position on the merits of the case. Cf. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Kerry Coal Co. v. U.M.W., 470 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 75-97.
69 Conflits of Interest, supra note 14, at 1308.
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2. Representing One Insured
Assume in the hypothetical case that Attorney refused to represent multiple
defendants prior to the initial interview, and was retained to defend only Dr.
Mensa. At the initial interview Dr. Mensa suggested that the plaintiff's injury, if
any, was attributable to the conduct of Dr. Carpenter. Dr. Mensa urged Attorney to file a cross-claim or take some other action that would focus attention on
his codefendant or some other party.
Joinder of all potential claims and parties may not always be wise tactically.
Particularly in cases in which both defendants are insured by the same carrier,
the carrier may wish to avoid a fight between the codefendants. Conventional
wisdom suggests that infighting between codefendants will enhance the plaintiff's
position in settlement negotiations and at trial. 70 On the other hand, an attorney
must insure that any decision that is made regarding joinder of claims or parties
is made only with the consent of the insured after full disclosure. For example,
the Guiding Principles provided:
VII. Counterclaims
In any suit where the company or the attorney selected by the company to defend the suit becomes aware that the insured may have a claim
for damages against another party to the lawsuit, which is likely to be
prejudiced or barred unless it is asserted as a counterclaim in the pending
action, the insured should beadvised that the pending suit may affect or
impair such claim; that the insurance company does not provide coverage
for any legal services or advice as to such claim; and that the insured may
wish to consult an attorney of his choice with respect to it. 71
Although the Guiding Principles isolated counterclaims due to the harsh consequences that follow from nonjoinder in many jurisdictions, 72 potential conflicts of
interest between the insured and the insurer may arise any time nonjoinder is to
the advantage of the insurer. Specifically, the attorney must take care to apprise
the insured of any limitation imposed by the insurer on the scope of the attorney's employment, as well as any period of limitations applicable to his claims.
The attorney should advise the insured to seek an independent attorney's assistance in the prosecution of any claims the insured insists on injecting into the
litigation over the insurer's objection.
An attorney may not simply ignore the insured's potential claims. For example, in Daugherty v. Runner 73 an attorney was retained by a decedent's estate to
pursue a wrongful death action arising out of an automobile accident. The attorney did not pursue a potential malpractice claim against the hospital that had
treated the decedent prior to her death. In a subsequent legal malpractice action
the attorney testified that he was not hired to pursue such a claim. Although the
appellate court affirmed a jury verdict for the attorney defendant on the evidence
presented at trial, the court opined:
We are not ready to hold that Mr. Runner had absolutely no duties to
his client with regard to a medical malpractice action simply because the
70

Havener, supra note 16, at 13.

71 See supra note 31.
72

But see Suchta v. Robinette, 596 P.2d 1380 (Wyo. 1979) (settlement of insured's liability and dismissal of action will not, without more, result in loss of insured's own claim against another party).
73 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. App. 1979).
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written contract did not specifically mention a malpractice suit. To do so
would require the client, presumably a layman who is unskilled in the
law, to recognize for himself all potential legal remedies. An attorney
cannot completely disregard matters coming to his attention which
should reasonably put him on notice that his client may have legal
problems or remedies that are not precisely74or totally within the scope of
the task being performed by the attorney.
C Investigation of the Claims.: Confidences and Secrets of the Insured
Assume that Dr. Mensa appeared at the initial client interview in a state of
agitation. He presented a history of his past disagreements with Insurer as a
result of its decision not to appeal an adverse judgment in a prior case, as well as
his unilateral settlement of another small claim. He inquired about Attorney's
duty to represent his interests as opposed to those of Insurer, and after satisfying
himself as to Attorney's loyalty, discussed the merits of the claim in considerable
detail.
Assume further, however, that out of fear of some future difficulty, Dr. Mensa
confided to Attorney that his temporary permit to practice in the forum state had
expired prior to the incident in suit. After the expiration of his permit and before
the claimant's injury, he applied for a renewal of his malpractice policy in a letter
written on stationery bearing his old address in a state in which he was still licensed. Unfortunately, the declarations of the renewal policy, which had been
forwarded to his old address, required that he be duly registered and licensed to
75
practice under the laws of all jurisdictions in which he intended to practice.
Also assume that Dr. Mensa sought to explain his conduct as the consequences of
his use of a drug, thereby inadvertently providing Insurer with an arguable claim
76
of exclusion under the policy's "drug" clause.
This interview with Dr. Mensa illustrates a recurring source of conflicts of
interests in defense practice. During the course of the client interview, the insured reveals a "fraud" in obtaining the policy that could render the contract
void ab initio, or a fact that might provide a basis for denying policy coverage.
The attorney might have avoided such disclosures by carefully explaining his
limited role at the beginning of the client interview. 77 It is customary, however,
for the attorney to engage in some questioning of the insured physician concerning his background and experience, and his knowledge of other facts that might
78
bear on the attorney's evaluation of the claim.
As a result of such questioning, the attorney may receive information from the
insured physician that the insurer does not know and that would provide a coverage defense for the insurer. It might be argued in our hypothetical case that
Insurer will learn of the physician's licensing problem or use of alcohol or drugs
during discovery. On the other hand, an experienced plaintiff's counsel may
withhold allegations involving such issues, or refrain from questioning the physi74

Id. at 17.

75 See Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Evers, 590 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1979).
76 See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 38, § 20.04. For other examples of inadvertent disclosures

suggesting policy defenses see Hutcheson, supra note 65.
77 Allen, Sleated Conftcs ofIntkrest oblnr in Inuuranw Litigation, in CONFLICrS OF INTEREsr IN INSURANCE PRAcrICE 51 (DRI Monograph No. 5, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Allen].
78 Hutcheson, supra note 65, at 39.
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cian on such matters to guarantee the availability of the policy proceeds. 79 Once
Dr. Mensa makes the disclosures, Attorney needs to choose one of the following
courses of action: (1) disclosure of all facts to Insurer, (2) withdrawal, or
(3) continued representation of the Insured without disclosure to Insurer.
Traditionally, communication by one joint client to common counsel concerning a matter in which both clients have sought representation has not been considered privileged as to the other join.t client, in an evidentiary sense. Indeed, an
early ABA Opinion held that the attorney should disclose to the insurer all information received from the insured relating to coverage.8 0 This opinion finds support in several appellate opinions which hold that the insured's consent to
disclosure is implied from his agreement to accept simultaneous representation. 8
This position is unacceptable. First, the attorney's ethical obligation to preserve
the confidences and secrets of each client is not coextensive with the rules of
evidentiary privilege. Evidence rules do not take into account the pervasive re82
quirement that an attorney not act to the detriment of either of his joint clients.
Second, application of this joint client rule presupposes that the clients are
united in a common interest. This assumption is not necessarily true. Arguably,
information bearing on the ability of the insured and the insurer to work together, such as the insured's dissatisfaction with the handling of prior claims,
may not be confidences and secrets of either client. Instead, this information
may be a legitimate subject of the insurer's inquiry if the information relates to
the feasibility of a continued relationship between the insured, the insurer, and
their common counsel. 83 All parties have an interest in determining if common
representation may proceed amicably. On the other hand, if the insured gives
information to the attorney that might provide a basis for denying policy coverage, then the clients are no longer united in a common interest, because the policyholder sees their common interest as a successful defense of the claim on the
merits. Application of a joint client disclosure rule invariably runs counter to
these expectations of the insured, and favors the insurer over the insured. In the
absence of a full explanation to the insured that disclosure may prejudice his
84
interests, the insured cannot be held to have consented to disclosure.
Withdrawal is also problematical. In the event of withdrawal, the attorney
may not represent either client, and will be under a continuing obligation to
preserve inviolate the insured's confidences and secrets. Accordingly, there is
some merit in the argument advanced by one commentator that:
The best way out is for [defense counsel] to withdraw from the case. The
insured loses nothing by his withdrawal because the attorney has been
silenced by permitting this confidential communication in the belief the
attorney would treat it as confidential. The company may be the loser,
but since the attorney had not been retained to ascertain coverage defenses or grounds of recission he has not breached any duty to the insurer
79 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note

38, § 20.04.

80 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 822 (1965).
81 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Engels, 20 A.D.2d 53, -,
244 N.Y.S.2d 983, 986 (1963); Shafer v. Utica
Mut. Ins. Co., 248 A.D. 279, -, 289 N.Y.S. 577, - (1936); see also Car and Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Goldstein,

179 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
82

E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 393-94 (S.D. Tex. 1969).

83
84

Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. at 873.
Cf. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 529, 140 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1977).
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by nondisclosure. His immediate withdrawal subject to reasonable notice
of his intention to do so, seems to be the only appropriate course and, as I
see it, no insurance
company could expect an attorney to pursue any
8 5
other course.

On the other hand, the attorney must provide some explanation for his withdrawal, if only a cryptic reference to a potential "ethical problem."'8 6 The very
act of withdrawal may alert the
insurer to the need for further investigation or
8 7
discovery relating to coverage.
Since withdrawal may prejudice the insured, and since counsel owes no duty
to the insurer to ascertain or otherwise develop evidence pertinent to coverage,
the best course of action in our hypothetical is for Attorney to represent the insured without disclosure of the insured's confidences.
The ABA apparently recognized the difficulties associated with disclosure or
withdrawal, and it overruled the earlier joint client disclosure rule. It adopted
the position that the attorney may not pass along to the insurer any confidence or
secret of the insured that might provide a defense in any post-judgment garnishment proceeding against the insurer.88 This rule was incorporated into the Guiding Principles in Paragraph VI.
VI. Duty of Attorney Not To Disclose Certain Facts and Information
Where the attorney selected by the company to defend a claim or
suit becomes aware of facts or information, imparted to him by the
insured under circumstances indicating the insured's belief that such
disclosure would not be revealed to the insurance company but
would be treated as a confidential communication to the attorney.,
which indicate to the attorney a lack of coverage, then as to such
matters, disclosures made directly to the attorney, should not be revealed to the company by the attorney nor should the attorney discuss with the insured the legal significance of the disclosure or the
85 Allen, supra note 77, at 52. Allen's suggestion that counsel must withdraw is supported by several
reported cases. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 382 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1967); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Keller, 17 Ill.
App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958).
86 Guiding Principle
IX provides:
IX. Withdrawal
In any case where the company or the attorney selected by the company to defend the
suit decides to withdraw from the defense of the action brought against the insured, the
insured should be fully advised of such decision and the reasons therefor; and every reasonable effort should be made to avoid prejudice to or impairment of the rights of the insured.
See supra note 31. There is some apparent conflict between I IX's requirement that the insured be advised
of the reasons for withdrawal, and VI's requirement that the attorney not discuss with the insured the
legal significance of facts indicating a lack of coverage. Presumably an attorney may tell his clients that
withdrawal is necessitated by ethical considerations, which the attorney may not explain further. An
attorney's dilemma is very much like that faced by the criminal defense attorney who is convinced that his
client is about to commit perjury. Any suggestion to the court by the attorney that there is an "ethical
problem," or attempted withdrawal, may suggest to the court or jury that the client's testimony is not to
be credited. Such conduct is viewed by some authorities as a betrayal of the client. See, e.g., Freedman,
Perjuy
The Lawyer's Trilemma, 1 LITIGATION 26 (1975).
87
Cf. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. McConnaughty, 228 Md. 1, 179 A.2d 117 (1962). The AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 6.6 (1980), appears to prohibit counsel from offering any explanation for his withdrawal, albeit simply a reference to a potential conflict of interest, if that would
prejudice the insured's confidences or secrets. Allen, supra note 77, recognizes that a defense attorney has
not been retained to ascertain coverage defenses, and therefore has no obligation to pass on the insured's
confidences regarding coverage to the insurer. Even so, he contends that withdrawal is the only appropriate course of action, although he appears to accept the possibility that the defense attorney's initial withdrawal might prejudice the clients confidence by stimulating the curiosity of the insurer's claims
department.
8 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 949 (1966).
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nature of the coverage question.8 9
If the attorney acquires information suggesting lack of coverage under circumstances indicating the insured's belief that such disclosure would not be revealed
to the company, the attorney may not betray the insured's confidence by revealing such information to the insurer.90 Nor may he use the confidential relationship with his client to gather information detrimental to the client's interest.
The requirement that the disclosure be "imparted to him by the insured under
circumstances indicating the insured's belief that such disclosure would not be
revealed to the insurance company" should be read liberally. The insured should
not have to express a desire to withhold the information from the insurer. If the
information is given during the course of consultation with the attorney and concerns a matter not bearing directly on the claim, then it should not be disclosed
to the insurer. The information, however, must "indicate to the attorney a lack
of coverage." 9 '
On the other hand, if a question of coverage arises because the attorney incidentally becomes aware of facts from some other source (not the client, the client's agents or employees, or the client's files), the attorney may follow the course
of action set forth in Guiding Principles Paragraphs IV and V:
IV. Conflicts of Interest Generally-Duties of Attorney
In any claim or in any suit where the attorney selected by the company
to defend the claim or action becomes aware of facts or information
which indicate to him a question of coverage in the matter being defended or any other conflict of interest between the company and the
insured with respect to the defense of the matter, the attorney should
promptly inform both the company and the insured, preferably in writing, of the nature and extent of the conflicting interest. In any such suit,
the company or its attorney should invite the insured to retain his own
counsel at his own expense to represent his separate interest.
V. Continuation By Attorney Even Though There is
A Conflict of Interest
Where there is a question of coverage or other conflict of interest, the
company and the attorney selected by the company to defend the claim
or suit should not thereafter continue to defend the insured in the matter
in question unless, after a full explanation of the coverage question, the
insured acquiesces in the continuation of such defense.
If the insured acquiesces in the continuation of the defense in the pending matter following a reservation of rights by the company or under an
agreement that the rights of the company and the insured as to the coverage question are not waived or prejudiced, the company retains the exclusive rights to control and conduct the defense of the case in good faith,
subject to the right of the insured or the additional attorney acting at the
expense of the insured to participate.
If the insured refuses to permit the insurance company and the attorney selected by the company to defend the claim or suit to continue the
defense of the pending matter while reserving the rights of the company
89

See supra note 31.
9 But see Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. App. 1974).
91 Other general information not relating to coverage but bearing on the working relationship between
the insured and the insurer may be the legitimate subject of inquiry by the insurer, who must determine,
together with the attorney, whether their tripartite relationship should continue. Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. at 873.
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and of the insured as to the coverage question, or if the full protection of
the separate interests of the insured and the company requires inconsistent contentions which cannot be presented in a common defense of the
pending matter, the insurance company or the insured should seek other
procedures to resolve the coverage question.
If facts or information indicating to the attorney a lack of coverage for
the insured should first come to the attention of the attorney after the trial
of the lawsuit has begun, the attorney should at the earliest opportunity
inform and advise the insured and the company of the possible conflicting
interests of the insured and the company. The attorney should further
seek to provide both the insured and the company with time and the
opportunity to consider the possible conflict of 9interests
and take appro2
priate steps to protect their individual interests.
Under these standards, the attorney may inform the insured and the insurer of
the nature and extent of the conflict and invite the insured to retain independent
counsel at the company's expense. 93 Counsel may not actively seek or develop
94
information from such sources, however.
Returning to the hypothetical, Attorney may pass on the general information
imparted to him concerning the Insured's difficulties with the company. Attorney should be leery, however, of providing information to Insurer relating to Dr.
Mensa's licensing problem or use of drugs, because Attorney obtained this information through his position as a fiduciary.
The consequences of disclosure of the insured's confidences and secrets are not
limited to disciplinary proceedings. The attorney who abuses his client's confidences and secrets to provide his employer with a coverage defense may face the
embarrassing prospect of later having to explain to the favored client why the
court held that its coverage defenses were waived by the attorney's breach of his
fiduciary duty. Moreover, he may expose himself to a claim for indemnification
if the insurer passed up a favorable settlement in reliance on the attorney's negligent advice on the coverage defense, or suffered extracontractual liability as a
result of the attorney's breach of duty to the insured.
For example, in Parsonsv. ContinentalNational Amencan Group 95 the insurer appointed an attorney to defend a "troubled" Mfinor in a civil action for assault.
The policy contained a standard exclusion for intentional acts of the insured, but
the insurer had not invoked the exclusion, believing that the youth was mentally
incompetent at the time the tort was committed. On the basis of confidential
information obtained from the insured's medical records and from client interviews, the attorney decided that the youth knew that what he was doing was
wrong. The attorney forwarded this information to the insurer and represented
92

See supra note 31.
Underwood, Con.fltas and Malpraatice. A Prnerfor Insurance Defense Counsel, 1 Ky. DEF. COUNS. 2, 5
(1981); see also the AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (1980), which provides the following illustra43

tion of "unethical" attorney conduct:
1(1) A lawyer is retained by an insurance company to represent its insured, who is being
sued in a personal injury action. Without the insured client's consent, the lawyer informs
the insurance company of possible defenses of the company against the insured client under
the policy. The lawyer has committed a disciplinary violation.
For the proposition that the company bears the cost of independent counsel when the conflict arises from a
potential coverage dispute see cases cited supra at note 54. But see Zilly, supra note 14, at 16 (suggesting
that a defense attorney avoid any discussion of coverage with the insurer).
9 Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d at 560-61.
95 113 Ariz. 223, 550 P.2d 94 (1976).
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the insurer in post judgment garnishment proceedings. Without discussing the
possibility that the confidential information might have been discovered from
another source, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the insurer was estopped
to deny coverage because of the attorney's duplicity. In addition, the court concluded that the carrier had failed to give due consideration to a proposed settlement offer within the policy limits, relying on the strength of the attorney's
advice with respect to the coverage defense. As a consequence of its failure to
consider the interests of the insured, the carrier was required to pay the full
amount of the judgment, an amount that exceeded its policy limits. 96 Although
the court was not presented with the issue of the attorney's liability to the insurer,
the settlement
one can foresee an action by the insurer for the difference between
97
offer and the policy limits, as well as the excess judgment.
D. Discovery
As court-reporting and lawyer's fees increase, more insurance carriers will impose significant restrictions on defense costs. Indeed, some commentators perceive no problem with carrier imposed limitations on discovery, as long as the
plaintiff's claims do not exceed the policy limits. 98 A restricted budget for the
defense presents a dilemma for a defense attorney in a medical malpractice action. Even if a judgment will be paid in full by the carrier, the physician policyholder's reputation is at stake, and his insurance premiums may increase
drastically as a result of an adverse judgment. The disappointed physician will
look for someone to blame for the adverse judgment, and if counsel's pretrial
preparation of the case suffered as a result of the carrier's frugality, the insured
may legitimately ask why he was never informed of the potential prejudice to his
case. The physician can be expected to argue that if he had known of the carrier's cost consciousness and understood the consequences, he would have hired
independent counsel, or at least pressured the carrier for the active defense that
he bargained for when he procured the policy of insurance.
In Bevevino v. Saydjzri 99 an automobile accident victim suffered multiple and
near fatal injuries of the spine, torso, and head. He was taken to the emergency
room of a local hospital where the doctor successfully treated all injuries, except
for one eye, which he believed had been destroyed at the moment of impact.
After the eye had been enucleated at another hospital, the patient sued the physician alleging that the eye could have been saved with prompt attention at the
emergency room. By the time of the second pretrial conference the attorney selected by the malpractice carrier still had not spoken to the defendant physician
about his version of the case.100 As a further "economy measure," local counsel
was appointed to represent the physician at a "foreign" deposition. Local counsel made no attempt to review the medical records with his client prior to the
deposition, or otherwise prepare him for the rigors of the upcoming deposition.
96Id. at -, 550 P.2d at 100; set also State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 382 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1967)
(the attorney procured statements from the insured demonstrating that he had lied to the insurer in his
initial accounts of the accident, thereby allowing the insurer to invoke the "cooperation clause" as a policy
Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1973).
defense);
97 See, e.g., Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 49 Il1. App. 3d 675, 364 N.E.2d 683 (1978).
9 Hutcheson, supra note 65, at 41.
9 76 F.R.D. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afd, 574 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1978).
10Id. at 90. The physician's trial attorneys were full-time employees of the carrier. Id. at 93 n.9.

19821

THE DOCTOR AND

His

LAWYER

The physician understandably "took refuge in the unprepared layman's haven of
'I don't remember.' "101 The deposition was presented at trial with disastrous
results. Moreover, the carrier failed to present any other testimony from the
doctor himself, or from any of the hospital personnel who could have described
the critical nature of the situation confronting the defendant at the time emergency treatment was administered. Finally, the carrier spent no time preparing
the expert witnesses that provided the core of the defense, and their testimony
was ineffective.10 2 The jury returned a verdict of $550,000, which the trial judge
attributed to the carrier's neglect:
Since the carrier is in the business of defending lawsuits, it must be presumed to know the necessary ingredients of a proper defense. We therefore can only conclude that the above described neglect was a function of
the carrier's deliberate decision not to spend enough money to have the
lawsuit properly defended. .

.

. Presumably it has concluded that by

taking all its assumed risks as a package it saves money in the end by
10 3
skimping on preparation costs and hoping for settlements.
While the trial judge's observations were made in passing on a motion for judgment n.o.v. in the medical malpractice action, the court could not resist giving its
opinion on the propriety of legal action against the carrier and its appointed
counsel.1 0 4 If the carrier's budgetary restrictions threaten the adequacy of the
defense, the attorney should let the insurer and the insured know, and withdraw
if necessary, while taking care not to prejudice either client's interests.
A restricted defense budget is not the only source of conflicts of interest that
arise during discovery. For example, the attorney may be induced by the carrier
to resist legitimate discovery requests to delay the proceedings or to obtain settlement leverage. In a recent case the attorney's overly combative approach to
discovery caused the plaintiff's attorney to withdraw his client's settlement offer
and proceed to trial. The jury returned a verdict in excess of the policy limits,
exposing both the carrier and the defense attorney to liability to the insured for
extracontractual damages. 105
E. Settlement
Most personal injury lawyers, and probably all insurance defense lawyers, are
familiar with the consequences of an insurer's failure to exercise good faith toward its insured in deciding whether to try to settle an action in which the plaintiff's claims exceed the policy limits. A "bad faith" refusal to settle the tort claim
may result in the insurer's liability not only for the policy limits, but also for any
excess judgment above the policy limits. 10 6 This extracontractual liability results
from judicial recognition of a conflict of interest between the insured and the
insurer. If the plaintiff's claims exceed the policy limits, it is in the interest of the
insured to have the case settled within the policy limits. As the plaintiff's de101Id.
at 91.
l0 2 Id.at 91-92.
0
1 3 Id.at 93.
'4Id. at 94 n.ll.
105 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 1976).

106 The leading case is Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967),
in which a tort claimant obtained an assignment of the insured's rights against the insurer, and recovered
not only the excess judgment but also substantial damages for the insured's mental suffering.
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mand approaches the policy limits, however, the insurer has little to lose by trying the case to a jury if it will not be liable for any excess. The insurer reserves
the power to control the defense and settlement. It must use this power in the
best interest of the insured and avoid exposing the insured to personal liability
for any excess as it resolves this conflict. The insurer's excess liability resulting
from this particular conflict has become standard fare in law school courses and
Continuing Legal Education programs. Less consideration has been paid to defense counsel's liabilities arising from this conflict, and other conflicts of interest
that arise during the course of settlement negotiations.
Our hypothetical litigation presents an increasingly common scenario. The
plaintiff's claims exceed the policy limits and threaten to expose the Insured physician to personal liability for any excess judgment or award of punitive damages.
The plaintiffs counsel has discovered the policy limits and has offered to settle all
of his client's claims within those limits. He has forwarded a "bad faith" 10 7 letter
in the hope of gaining some psychological advantage over the Insurer, or to cre10
ate a record for subsequent litigation.°
What are Attorney's ethical obligations
when he reviews the file and discovers the settlement demand?
Assume that Attorney contacted Insurer regarding the settlement demand.
He was told by Insurer's claims manager that Dr. Mensa has given his consent to
a settlement of the claims against him, and that settlement is therefore authorized under the terms of the policy.10 9 As a matter of custom or practice, however,
Insurer will not settle any case in which the Advisory Committee of the State
Medical Society has reviewed the patient's hospital records and determined that
there has been no malpractice. Relying on this custom, Insurer refuses to give
Attorney any settlement authority.
At this point a prudent attorney will follow the course of action set forth in the
Guiding Principles:
II. Claim Or Suit In Excess Of Limits' 10
In any claim where there is a probability that the damage will exceed
the limits of the policy and the company has retained counsel to defend
the claim, or in any suit in which the prayer of the complaint exceeds the
limit of the policy, or in which there is an unlimited or indefinite prayer
for damages and a probability that the verdict may exceed the coverage
limit, the company or its attorney should timely inform the insured of the
danger of exposure in excess of the limit of the policy. The insured should
be invited to retain additional counsel at his own expense to advise him
with respect to that exposure. So long as the financial interest of the company in the outcome of the litigation continues, the company retains the
exclusive right to control and conduct the defense of the case.
107

See supra text accompanying note 37.

lo An attorney may not forward such correspondence directly to the insured or the insurer once a
defense attorney has been retained. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1981).

However, if he believes that the defense attorney is not relaying settlement offers submitted in connection
with a pending suit, he may file a copy of the communication with the court. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1348 (1975). The AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT
Rule 3.9 (1980), would permit a lawyer to send a written offer of settlement directly to an adverse party
seven days or more after that party's attorney has received the same offer of settlement in writing.
109 See supra text accompanying note 17.
110
See supra note 31.
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III. Settlement Negotiations In Claims Or Suits With Excess Exposure
In any claim where there is a probability that the damage will
exceed the limit of the policy and the company has retained counsel
to defend the claim, or in any suit in which it appears probable that
an amount in excess of the limit of the policy is involved, the company or its attorney should inform the insured or any additional attorney retained by the insured at his own expense of significant
settlement negotiations, whether within or beyond the limits of the
policy. Upon request, the insured, or such additional attorney, shall
be entitled to be informed of all settlement negotiations. The Company shall, upon request, make available to the insured or such additional attorney all pertinent factual information the company and its
attorney may have for evaluation by the insured or such additional
attorney.
It is obvious that neither Insurer nor Attorney may base its legal duty to Dr.
Mensa on the findings of the medical review committee.II' The language of the
hypothetical policy authorizes Insurer to settle if either the Insured or the medical committee consent. Once the Insured has authorized settlement, Insurer
must consider all aspects of the case, including the probability of a verdict and its
range if adverse, the strengths and weaknesses of all the evidence that may be
presented by either side, the quality of the medical result, the experience and
capacity of the opposing counsel, and the history of such litigation in the particular jurisdiction.1 2 In addition, both Insurer and Attorney have an obligation to
forward the settlement offer to Dr. Mensa, advise him of the nature of the potential conflict, and recommend that he employ independent counsel to protect his
interests. If Attorney fails to recognize these obligations suggested by the Guiding Principles, fails to recommend a reasonable settlement, or fails to utilize the
full amount of his settlement authority, and the failure subjects either of his clients to an unnecessary loss, he may be held liable to Dr. Mensa 113 or Insurer" t4 in
subsequent malpractice litigation. Moreover, the Insured's malpractice claim is
assignable."15 Plaintiffs in malpractice suits often obtain an assignment of the
insured's rights in full or partial settlement of any excess judgment against the
insured personally, and then pursue the defense attorney as an additional defendant. 16 A prudent defense attorney therefore will follow the recommendations of
the Guiding Principles when faced with the carrier's arbitrary methods, and document his efforts to fully inform both of his clients and secure their cooperation.
The necessity of keeping the insured informed and securing his cooperation
takes on added significance in medical malpractice actions. Professional liability
policies usually contain a provision restricting the insurer's power to settle a
"' Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 850-51, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608-09
(1973).
112 I. at 849-50, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
13 See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
114 See Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. 49 11. App. 3d 675, 364 N.E.2d 683 (1977). An attorney's files are a legitimate subject of discovery by the insured or his assignee. Terrell v. Western Cas. &
Sur. Co., 427 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Ky. App. 1968).
''5 Grundy v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 425 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
116 &Se, e.g., Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Grundy v. Manchester

Ins. & Indem. Co., 425 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). See also National Law Journal, Aug. 31, 1981, at

22, col. 6 (reporting a California case in which an accident victim's attorney represented the defendant
driver in litigation against her former defense attorney and insurer for their refusal to entertain any offers
of settlement). Cf. Medical Protective Co. v. Davis, 581 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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claim without the insured's consent. This policy feature permits the policyholder
to reject a settlement that will blemish his reputation. Even a modest settlement
of a nuisance claim may be against the physician's best interest, 1 7 and he buys
this privilege to reject settlement offers without concern for the carrier's exposure.
Accordingly, a situation may arise in which the physician will reject what appears to be a reasonable settlement offer. Clearly, an attorney who concludes a
settlement at the request of his billpaying client over the objection of the physician policyholder faces a risk of being named a codefendant in an action for
injury to the insured's reputation, loss of an opportunity to file a countersuit, or
for reimbursement for any increased insurance costs attributable to a wrongful
settlement." 8 Further, counsel may incur liability to the physician even if the
insurer is authorized to settle over the insured's objection. In Rogers v. Robson,
Masters, Ryan, Brumund and Belom " 9 the doctor alleged that defense counsel negotiated a nominal settlement at the request of the carrier even though discovery
had produced no evidence of malpractice on his part and the doctor had expressed a desire to take the case to trial. The policy authorized settlement without the insured's consent if the insured physician was no longer a policyholder,
which was the case. The court, however, ruled that the physician was entitled to
a full disclosure of the insurer's intent to settle the litigation without his consent
and contrary to his express instructions. The attorney's obligation to disclose the
conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured arose from his attorneyclient relationship with the plaintiff, and was not affected by the extent of the
insurer's authority under the terms of the policy. Because the defense attorney
did not disclose the conflict and advise the insured to release the carrier from its
responsibilities and continue the defense at his own expense, the attorney was
liable for any damages that the doctor could prove he suffered as a result of the
attorney's malpractice.
One final case arising from the settlement of a medical malpractice case is
noteworthy. In Zalta v. Bilh'ps 120 a doctor and his medical group had been two of
thirteen codefendants in a medical malpractice action. An attorney was retained
by their insurer to represent them. After several conferences a settlement was
concluded. Under the terms of the settlement neither the doctor nor the medical
group were required to contribute any amount. The doctor, however, was erroneously named as a contributing defendant in a newspaper article concerning the
litigation. He sued his former defense attorney alleging that the attorney's failure
to announce in open court that his clients were not contributing to the settlement
led to the adverse publicity and injury to his reputation. While the court held
that the defense attorney is not an insurer of either his client's self-esteem or his
public reputation, and that the attorney's failure to publicize the terms of the
settlement was not the proximate cause of any damage to the attorney's former

117 W.

YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 323 (1971); 2 LONG, supra note 39, § 12.25.
118 Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, -, 419 A.2d 417, 424-27 (1980). Only one

reported case appears to place any qualification on the exercise of such a power. Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink
Corp., 78 Cal. App. 3d 475, 144 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1978). The reported cases have given some substantive
content to the concept of a wrongful settlement. Specifically, a jury will be permitted to find that the
physician would have lost the case in any event. In such a case, the attorney's misconduct cannot be found
to have been the proximate cause of any damages. See, e.g., 84 N.J. at -, 419 A.2d at 426-27.
11981 I11.2d 201, 407 N.E. 2d 47 (1980).
120 144 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
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client, the case serves as a final compelling illustration and reminder of the delicate position occupied by insurance defense attorneys in medical malpractice
litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION

The attorney retained by an insurance company to defend a claim against its
insured finds himself in a position that lawyers traditionally have avoided: the
representation of multiple clients with potentially conflicting interests in a litigation context. The interrelationships among the insurer, the insured, and defense
counsel are unique and the ethical problems that arise are not always apparent,
even to prudent attorneys. This Article has suggested how conflicts might arise
at various stages of the litigation of a hypothetical medical malpractice action in
which an attorney has been retained to represent the interests of both the physician policyholder and his insurance carrier, and how such conflicts may give rise
to legal malpractice claims instituted by one or the other of the attorney's clients.
The problems discussed are recurring and are not limited to this particular type
of insurance defense litigation.
While several commentators have contended that a new malpractice "crisis" is
at hand, this Article suggests that a defense attorney's continued attention to
developments in the area of "insurer's bad faith," more systematic monitoring of
his litigation files, and strict adherence to available ethical standards should
prove to be sufficient preventive medicine in this area of legal practice.

